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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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May 19, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR

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Chief Negotiator
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency[Redacted]
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on START -- Friday, May 21, 1982

The attached papers on START policy issues have been prepared by the START Interdepartmental Group in accord with NSDD-33 for discussion and decision at the National Security Council meeting to be held in the White House Cabinet Room on Friday, May 21, at 9:30 a.m.

Michael O. Wheeler
Michael O. Wheeler *OC*
Staff Secretary

Attachments as Noted

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Review May 19, 2002

Classified and Extended by William P. Clark

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 18, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: START Papers for NSC Meeting

Attached are three papers prepared by the Inter-departmental Group on START Policy for review by the NSC at its May 21 meeting. These papers are:

at Tols B, C, D.

1) Interim Restraints: We will circulate tomorrow a revision of the attached paper, incorporating new language from OSD on Option 3, plus any appropriate alterations to other options.

2) Consensus START Issues

3) Mobile ICBMs

A series of collateral constraints is under review by the Interdepartmental Group. On a number of these issues, there is interagency agreement in principle:

1) There should be counting rules to associate the number of re-entry vehicles with each missile type, and to associate missile types with their launchers.

2) There should be a comprehensive disclosure of agreed baseline data for the parameters limited by START.

However, these and other possible collateral constraints require further refinement and technical analysis, including an evaluation of their interrelationships, before a comprehensive package or alternative options can be presented for decision.

The issue of ICBM refire/reconstitution capabilities also requires additional analysis, including an evaluation of the verification difficulties and the necessity of limits on non-deployed missiles.

The IG will in the immediate future prepare analyses of collateral constraints and the ICBM refire/reconstitution issue, with the intention of providing recommendations or options to the NSC in time for decision prior to the opening of START negotiations.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

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INTERIM RESTRAINTSBACKGROUND

It has been U.S. policy during the Reagan Administration to take no action that would undercut existing SALT agreements pending the completion of our START policy review provided the Soviets exercise similar restraint. With our policy review nearly completed, we must now decide what kind of interim restraints would best serve our interests after START negotiations begin. There will be substantial interest in some form of interim restraint from the Congress, our Allies, and the public as we proceed with START negotiations. A decision on interim restraints must be consistent with our position on units of account and therefore has been delayed until now.

IMPACT OF CURRENT POLICY

Under SALT I Interim Agreement (IA) restraints, both sides would be required to dismantle submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers; the U.S. would dismantle retired Polaris launchers while the Soviets would dismantle deployed submarine launchers.

To comply with SALT II provisions, the Soviets are observing its limit of 820 multiple warhead (MIRVed) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the 30 per year production restriction on the Backfire bomber. Without this restraint, the Soviets could deploy over 160 additional MIRVed ICBMs by 1985.

SALT II limitations affect U.S. programs in the following ways:

-- the planned U.S. MIRVed missile deployments would put the U.S. over the combined MIRV limits of 1200 and 1320 before the end of 1985;

-- those MX basing mode alternatives that would build new fixed launchers would violate the SALT II (and IA) ban on such construction. We have made no basing decisions, however, and any impact would be several years away.

INTERIM RESTRAINT OPTIONS

There is general agreement that this Administration should adopt some form of interim restraint. This is especially important if we are to avoid new pressures for

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ratifying SALT II, which would surely cause a contentious and ultimately harmful debate. There are two broad approaches available:

1) Continuation of our current policy ("Not undercut existing agreements"): This would continue the current restraints on Soviet and U.S. forces if the Soviets continue to adhere to the same constraints. For two to three years there would be only modest impact on U.S. strategic plans. The impact on Soviet strategic forces, as indicated above, would be more significant: the Intelligence Community believes they would deploy MIRVed ICBMs well beyond the constraints of SALT II. The limitations of the SALT II Protocol would have applied only through the end of 1981 and thus would not be a part of this policy. The SALT I IA restraints would require both sides to continue dismantling old missile firing submarines as new ones were deployed; a SALT II restraint alone would not. Continuing our present policy would, however, permit substantial warhead growth on both sides.

It is the view of the agencies that support Option 1 that it represents the most effective means of avoiding a prolonged and divisive debate over the future status of the SALT II treaty. There are a number of valid reasons why we do not wish to ratify or renegotiate SALT II, including its unequal treatment of heavy ICBMs, its failure to capture Backfire, and its deficiencies with respect to verification. None of these major problems can be addressed in the context of an interim restraint regime without opening a new negotiation with the Soviets -- which would inevitably divert us from the priority task of strategic arms reductions to which the President has committed his Administration.

On the other hand, to reject any form of interim restraint -- or to declare a policy to which the Soviets would not adhere -- would free the USSR to take steps, such as the deployment of additional MIRVed ICBMs, which the Intelligence Community considers likely, and which we could not match in the short term. The intentional ambiguity in our current policy -- which does not assert that we will "adhere to" existing agreements -- provides flexibility to continue our own strategic force modernization while both inhibiting possible Soviet moves and most effectively defusing the SALT II issue politically.

An option which seeks to pick and choose among existing particular SALT provisions would in effect leave the Soviets unconstrained and thus would heighten debate in the U.S. and

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Europe over the wisdom of not ratifying SALT II. In addition, this approach would suggest that the Administration's opposition to SALT II stems primarily from the concern that the treaty would inhibit MX basing options -- which is not the case. In so narrowing the basis for our opposition to SALT II, the approach would undercut our ability to make our case against ratification, while at the same time stimulating increased opposition to the eventual MX basing scheme.

2) A new but temporary restraint that would supplement our current policy. The U.S. could initiate START negotiations with a public proposal not to increase the total number of ballistic missile warheads beyond the number currently deployed by either side, provided the Soviet Union exercised the same restraint. This proposal to "cap" ballistic missile warheads could allow the Administration to capture the political initiative, respond to the groundswell of demand for real arms control, and allow us to distance ourselves from SALT II.

Under such a missile warhead cap, modernization within existing ballistic missile warhead numbers would be permitted. We would continue to deploy new SLBMs on Trident submarines; and after 1986, MX would begin to be deployed. Without a cap, these deployments would be a net addition to currently deployed systems; but under a missile warhead "cap", old systems would be replaced with more survivable new systems.

The Soviets would, however, be unlikely to accept such a proposal; in all probability they would reject it as inequitable or make a counter-proposal which could, for example, include a cap on bomber weapons. In addition, this could require extensive negotiations which would distract from the principal negotiating effort.

3) A new policy that expresses U.S. determination to achieve strategic stability by a combination of modernization and arms control, and that distances the Administration from acceptance of SALT I and II. OSD has provided the following rationale:

This policy would be stated as follows: In order to enhance strategic stability the United States will modernize its strategic forces while negotiating for substantial reductions. It will continue to respect those provisions of existing agreements that do not adversely affect the President's program of strategic force modernization which is essential to protecting the U.S. deterrent and achieving stability and strategic arms reductions.

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The Office of the Secretary of Defense believes that the proposal of some other agencies to extend the policy adopted during the Administration's review of START policy runs a significant risk of committing us to abide by SALT I and II for the indefinite future. This would leave the administration vulnerable to the charge that despite the argument that it is seriously flawed, it had tacitly accepted SALT II after all.

In the event a START treaty has not been concluded by 1984, critics will argue that the stubborn refusal to ratify SALT II has doomed the prospects for an arms limitation treaty, stimulated a world wide anti-nuclear movement affecting the U.S. and its allies, and yielded the arms-control initiative to the Soviet Union.

The argument that, "Since we are abiding by SALT II, why not ratify it and cause the Soviets to make the 10% reduction the treaty requires?" has broad (and growing) appeal to which we will lack a simple but persuasive answer unless we clearly establish the basis on which we continue to oppose the SALT II treaty.

OSD believes that there is a simple, coherent basis upon which to distance the Administration from SALT II: it may conflict with the President's modernization program. The most important example is the deployment of a survivable MX missile. If it entails the construction of new, fixed ICBM launchers, as "Dense Pack" may well, deployment of the MX would almost certainly violate SALT II.

Once the Administration has adopted a post-review policy of adhering to SALT II there will be no turning-point opportunity to alter that policy. The initiation of START may well be the last logical opportunity to establish a policy we can sustain through 1984.

A policy of adherence to SALT II so long as the Soviets show "similar restraint" has the additional unfortunate connotation that current Soviet behavior does in fact exhibit "restraint." The fact is that the Soviet strategic build-up continues relentlessly. We ought not to contribute to the legitimacy of their claim to moderation or restraint.

It is difficult for anyone not a proponent of SALT II to argue with the formulation we propose. It does not say that we will depart from the SALT II limits. It does say that we will be guided by the requirements for modernization, stability

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and arms control. And it implies, quite properly in our view, that if those objectives cannot be reached within the confines of SALT II, we will depart from SALT II. Such a formulation would protect the MX no matter how based. And it would give the Administration a far more plausible argument than it now has for refusing to ratify SALT II.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After considering the merits of these three interim restraint options, the START Interagency Group was unable to reach a consensus. OSD and the START Negotiator believe that our policy should be Option 3, distancing the U.S. from SALT by stressing national security requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, State, and ACDA support Option 1, agreeing that this policy should be reviewed regularly to ensure that it remains in the U.S. interest.

The Option 2 cap on warheads would have some military advantages over Option 1, if the verification, negotiating, and political drawbacks could be overcome. It is the opinion of the Interagency Group that these drawbacks outweigh the military advantages.

Recommendations:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, State, and ACDA recommend that the interim restraint policy of the U.S. be Option 1, continuing our current policy of not undercutting existing SALT agreements provided the Soviets exercise similar restraint.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

OSD and the START Negotiator recommend that the interim restraint policy of the U.S. be Option 3, distancing the U.S. from SALT by stressing national security requirements.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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SECRETCONSENSUS START ISSUES

There is interagency consensus on the following positions for inclusion in the US position on START.

1. Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs)

The US should not seek special limits on ALCMs themselves. ALCM carriers should not be subject to restrictions beyond those applicable to other heavy bombers. All agencies agree that the US should not propose limits on maximum ALCM loadings per bomber in our START proposal. (Some believe that we might eventually consider accepting such limits consistent with our force requirements in return for significant Soviet concessions.)

2. Access to Flight Test Data

Access to flight test telemetry is essential to the verification of certain START limitations. All agencies agree that the US should seek a ban on all telemetry encryption in flight tests of START-limited systems. Additional measures to ensure access to relevant flight test data may also be required. Decisions on additional measures should be made after the provisions of a START agreement become more clear. Such decisions should balance the value of additional information for monitoring Soviet START-limited activities against the impact of reciprocal measures on US flight test practices.

3. Missile Flight Tests

The US should not seek a limitation which would set an annual quota of missile flight tests.

4. Bomber Pre-Launch Survivability

One potentially useful limitation appears to be a ban on "depressed trajectory" SLBM flight tests. However, because of verification problems and the possible implications for certain US systems (e.g., flight tests of Trident II), we should not propose a ban on such testing pending further review.

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5. Limits on Air Defenses

We do not envisage air defense limitations in a START agreement. We should, however, use the lack of constraints on Soviet air defenses to achieve preferential treatment of US bombers and their weapons in START.

6. Limits on Civil Defense

Although the Soviet Union has a considerably more active civil defense program than the US, we should not seek civil defense limitations in START. Such limitations would be very difficult to negotiate or verify and could inhibit US civil defense programs.

7. Limits on Anti-Submarine Warfare Capabilities

As there appears to be no compelling US security requirement for ASW limitations, they should not be included in our START proposal.

RECOMMENDATION: All agencies recommend that these positions be approved for use in formulating the US START position.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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SECRETMobile ICBMsBackground Considerations

The US was unable to gain Soviet acceptance of a land-mobile ban in the 1972 Interim Agreement, but stated unilaterally that it would regard Soviet mobile deployments to be inconsistent with the Agreement.

Mobile ICBMs were banned for the duration of the SALT II Protocol, but would have been permitted under the Treaty itself after expiration of the Protocol. Toward the end of the SALT II negotiations, the US put the Soviets on notice that it intended to deploy mobile ICBM launchers in the MPS deceptive-basing system then under consideration.

Until final decisions are taken on MX basing, which are not likely before the opening of START, we will not know whether the US will be required to deploy mobile ICBMs. Some MX deployment options may call for transporting the missile in its cannister between permanent hardened facilities. In addition, we may wish to protect the option to deploy systems in the future for other new ICBMs.

The Soviets have developed and will probably soon test a small, solid-propellant ICBM that would be suitable for off-road mobile deployment (similar to the SS-20 IRBMs basing arrangement). They have also developed a medium, solid-propellant missile that could conceivably be deployed as a mobile, perhaps deceptively based. And unlike the US, the Soviets do not face public opinion constraints on their mobile programs.

Even with intrusive verification measures, there could be substantial uncertainties in our estimates of the number of Soviet mobile ICBMs. The degree of monitoring uncertainty would depend on such factors as the basing arrangement employed, the number of mobiles deployed, and the effectiveness of agreed collateral constraints and cooperative verification measures.

Options

1. Propose a ban on mobile ICBMs.

Among the advantages of a mobile ban are that it would avoid the verification difficulties associated with counting mobiles; it would close off a deployment option that the Soviets were in a

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much better position to use than the US; and it would make it easier for us to disrupt Soviet ICBM refire operations by targeting (fixed) ICBM launchers.

Among the disadvantages are that it would close off future US mobile options for MX or a smaller ICBM; it would prevent the Soviets from moving to a more survivable land-basing system which it can be argued would have a destabilizing effect; and, by constraining Soviet efforts to promote the survivability of their ICBM force, it could make them reluctant to accept significant reductions.

2. Propose a ban on mobile ICBMs with a definition of mobility that excluded deceptive basing from the prohibition.

Among the advantages, this would define mobility and transportability so as to ban SS-20-type deployments of ICBMs while permitting the kind of basing approach we might wish to employ. Among the disadvantages, it would legitimize Soviet deceptive basing which, depending on the cooperative measures worked out, might be difficult to verify. And given previous US treatment of deceptive basing as a mobile concept, it would be difficult to gain acceptance of the proposed definition.

3. Propose that mobiles be permitted, but only in accordance with certain requirements designed to facilitate verification.

Under this approach, the Treaty would have to specify criteria for permitted mobile deployments (e.g., central basing, data exchanges) and call for additional collateral constraints and cooperative measures to promote verifiability.

The advantages of this option are that it would give us flexibility for MX or future mobile ICBM basing; it could provide for stringent measures to count Soviet mobiles; and it would enable the Soviets to move to more survivable ICBM basing which could have a stabilizing effect.

The disadvantages are that it would involve greater verification uncertainties than a ban; it would provide an option that the Soviets are more likely to exploit; and it might lead to disagreements on what is verifiable. It could also complicate the serious problem of dealing with refires and reconstitution.

4. Make no proposals with regard to mobile ICBMs in our initial position.

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The main advantage of this approach is that it would hold open our options for dealing with mobiles in START at least until after a final decision is made on MX basing and until we know about possible US requirements for a new mobile ICBM. Otherwise, on the one hand, by opting for a ban on mobiles we could be ruling out a system needed for national security. On the other hand, by choosing to allow mobiles, we could be allowing the Soviets freedom to deploy systems which would pose severe verification and refire problems.

The main disadvantage is that it foregoes the opportunity to lay down a strong position from the outset.

Conclusion: All agencies recommend that the US adopt option 4. However, the Chairman of the START delegation supports option 2.

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TALKING POINTS

The Protocol

All options for interim restraint assume that the SALT II Protocol, which was scheduled to expire at the end of 1981, will be abandoned.

- While this may hold some advantages for the U.S., the Soviets are in a good position to move forward rapidly in some of the areas limited by the Protocol:



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TALKING POINTS

CAP on Ballistic Missile Warheads

The JCS proposal to "cap" ballistic missile warheads at current levels appears to call for missile-by-missile counting.

- This would be all but impossible to monitor with NTM
 - ° Since the Soviets have tested and deployed both MIRVed and single-RV variants of their MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, there is considerable uncertainty as to the present warhead count.
 - ° For most systems, the Soviets could increase deployed RVs undetected during periodic maintenance.

SOVIET MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs

MIRVed ICBMs

SS-17

| | |
|-------|-----------|
| Mod 1 | 4 MIRVs |
| Mod 2 | Single RV |
| Mod 3 | 4 MIRVs |

SS-18

| | |
|-------|----------------|
| Mod 1 | Single RV |
| Mod 2 | 8/10 MIRVs |
| Mod 3 | Single RV |
| Mod 4 | 10/12/14 MIRVs |

SS-19

| | |
|-------|-----------|
| Mod 1 | 4/6 MIRVs |
| Mod 2 | Single RV |
| Mod 3 | 6 MIRVs |

MIRVed SLBM

SS-N-18

| | |
|-------|-----------|
| Mod 1 | 2/3 MIRVs |
| Mod 2 | Single RV |
| Mod 3 | 7 MIRVs |

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TALKING POINTS

SALT I and II Restraints

If the U.S. abandons SALT I and II as interim restraints -- as proposed by OSD -- the Soviets are in a position to move forward in a number of areas most of which are projected in the unconstrained forces in NIE 11-3/8-81:

- Not have to compensate for new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines being deployed, with dismantling of others, such as Y-class SSBNs (we expect the 14th D-III unit to begin sea trials this summer and estimate that between 1982 and 1986 nine new SSBNs with 168 SLBM launchers will be deployed).
- Increase the number of MIRV-accountable SS-17 and SS-19 ICBM launchers beyond the sublimit on such launchers.
- Increase the amount of telemetry encryption on systems covered by the Treaty. There are no technical barriers to such a move.
- Test more than one "new type" ICBM (two solid-propellant ICBMs could begin flight testing at any time).
- Increase Backfire production and/or begin aerial refueling of it.
- Increase the number of RVs on existing ICBMs. (We believe the SS-18 Mod 4 was designed to carry a total of 14 RVs).

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TALKING POINTS

Mobile ICBMs

Without a ban on land-mobile ICBMs, we believe that the Soviets could begin flight testing their small, solid propellant ICBM from a mobile launcher at any time. If testing began soon, it would be ready for deployment in 1985.

The deployment of a mobile could make counting deployed missiles, aggregate numbers of warheads (RVs), and aggregate throw-weight much more difficult.



- With central basing:

- CIA: 10-25% uncertainty

- DIA: 25-50% uncertainty

- Other basing modes:

- 50-90% uncertainty

- These uncertainties could be reduced by:

- Passive cooperative measures

- e.g., Designated deployment areas
 - Requirement for central basing
 - Standard base configuration

- Active cooperative measures

- e.g., On-site inspection
 - Technical monitoring devices

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TALKING POINTS

Excess Missiles

The USSR produces extra missiles for maintenance and training, and these may form, in time of war, a reserve force for refiring.

We believe that the USSR maintains reserve missiles for its ICBM force beyond the number required for maintenance and training, but we are uncertain about the extent of these reserves.

We do not believe that the USSR is planning to use its older ICBMs as part of a strategic reserve force, because:

- Older launchers (SS-7, SS-8, SS-9) have been dismantled or converted.

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We believe that some newer missiles (SS-17, 18, 19) are available for a reserve missile force;

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The Soviets have plans to reconstitute strategic forces, but we are highly uncertain about their actual capabilities.

- Overall, we believe the Soviets could maintain the combat effectiveness of many of the surviving withheld weapons and would be able to reconstitute strategic forces to at least some extent with surviving reserve weapons and materiel.

- Damage to the logistic system and requirements for decontamination would stretch out the time required for reconstitution.

- Vulnerabilities:

- Soft ICBM support areas
Rail transfer points
Rear storage depots

- Each of these facilities can handle only a few missiles at a time.

- Rail and road networks could be damaged severely.

- These vulnerabilities could be reduced by:

- Dispersing combat reserves before the outbreak of war, or during the war

- Delivering reserves to remote off-loading points

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TALKING POINTS

Brezhnev's 18 May Speech

In regard to START, Brezhnev said:

- Soviets ready to begin talks "...without delay."
- U.S. ready to resume talks "...a step in the right direction."
- Soviets in favor of "...substantial reductions."
- U.S. position on reductions "...absolutely unilateral ... because U.S. would like in general to exclude from the talks the strategic arms it is now most intensively developing."
- Talks, to be successful, "... should be conducted with due regard for each other's security interests and strictly in accordance with principle of equality and equal security."
- Also "... necessary to preserve everything positive that has been achieved earlier. The talks do not start from scratch but a good deal of far from useless work has been done."
- Proposes that "... strategic armaments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. be frozen right now, as soon as the talks begin. Frozen quantitatively. And so that their modernization is limited to the utmost."

We conclude that:

- The Soviets are willing to begin negotiations soon.
- They will play to U.S. and European public opinion favorable to SALT II and/or a freeze.
- They will seek to preserve as much as they can of SALT II.
- Despite Brezhnev's nod toward "substantial reductions," we see no indication that the Soviets are thinking of reductions in terms of new approaches.

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